

## SECTION A

Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the space provided.

Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.

- 1 How far do you agree with the view that China's entry into the Korean War was triggered by US forces invading North Korea in October 1950?

Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(25)

The justification for China's entry into the Korean War is <sup>constantly</sup> ~~often~~ disputed. <sup>As seen</sup> ~~Extract~~ in Bragan's interpretation some schools of thought once it to <sup>the</sup> U.S.' exchange in war aims ~~and~~ <sup>where</sup> ~~invasion of Korea~~ which drew China into the War for reasons of self defense and loyalty. Alternatively, Frank's interpretation alludes to the already preparedness of China for eventual involvement as early as U.S. troops were in Korea. Overall, it can be assumed China had multiple reasons for entry largely owing to self defense but also pressures from the USSR, North Korean loyalty and domestic affairs in China which <sup>reveals</sup> ~~makes~~ the newly formed Communist nation both had interests of self defense and opportunism - consolidating the already preexisting need to join the war ~~and~~ instead of "triggering a"

Bragan's interpretation highlights the way China repeatedly warned U.S. of ~~that~~ the consequence of the invasion of North Korea of



evident within "indiscarded plainly". This is justified by the knowledge that Mao repeatedly warned Truman of that if ~~the~~ U.S./UN/ROK forces were to be used on the Chinese border they would subsequently be forced to retaliate. <sup>This</sup> ~~was~~ as the interpretation clearly states <sup>matter</sup> was a ~~matter~~ of the fear of U.S. imperialism evident within "self-confident aggressor". ~~Summarizing Frank right~~ Thus, China became fearful of U.S. expansion <sup>only</sup> when U.S. war aims began to <sup>this, suggestion the Korean invasion was a trick.</sup> change from containment to roll back.

<sup>However</sup> ~~that~~ Frank is more convincing in suggesting that China was always prepared evident within "He ordered the PLA to begin troop deployments". This is supported by the evidence that Mao ~~sent~~ offered Kim troops in early 1950 yet Kim declined. Thus, it is more justified to suggest that the crossing of the ~~the~~ 38<sup>th</sup> parallel did not create the <sup>the need</sup> ~~desire~~ for Chinese involvement, but consolidated it, as a response from an accumulation of factors and American actions.

Another reason to suggest that China's entry into the Korean war was



not "triggered" by U.S. invasion of North Korea which both extracts allude to is China's self defense interest. Bragan highlights that China was fearful they had to face "~~Chinese~~ <sup>U.S</sup> initiative else where". China who had just emerged after years of civil war had interests to prevent U.S. activity in China after military momentum that military ~~momentum~~ <sup>activity</sup> gave the U.S. the confidence to advance into North Korea in the first place after the Inchon Landing.

Simultaneously Frank highlights China's fear that the U.S. <sup>may</sup> "sweep up to the Chinese border".

It is clear that China was "triggered" by the possibility to involve in the war before their entry into North Korea, and the invasion merely consolidated <sup>China's</sup> ~~North~~ Korea's fears. ~~and~~ This gave Mao who was facing difficulty gaining consent from the Politburo to <sup>a reason to become involved</sup> become involved in the war. ~~What~~ What further consolidated the need for self defense was the remobilization of Japan who bordered China's industrial heartland of Manchuria. Thus, after World War II and the Sino-Japanese war for China to have overlooked the newly formed alliance of Japan and U.S. is



as not a significant  
~~not a threat would have~~ threat would have been  
highly unlikely. Then, the crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel  
did not impact "trigger" the entry of the war  
as Frank's interpretation implies but consolidates  
the security necessity of doing so.

~~And~~ China also would have been  
triggered to enter the Korean war as  
a part of <sup>the</sup> loyalty ~~not only~~ to the  
greater Communist movement - ~~but also~~  
to repay <sup>Korea</sup> for the support <sup>they received</sup>  
during the Chinese war. <sup>These are attitudes which would have predated</sup>  
<sup>in the crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel</sup> Although, Brogan  
seems to overlook Chinese entry as "not  
simply" a problem of "losing face"  
it is a vital reason. ~~From~~ Frank's interpretation  
alludes to this by ~~the~~ the fact it was one  
step in a "process with much deeper roots"  
potentially commenting on the great cold  
war environment. It is known that Mao  
was greatly influenced by the USSR to  
send assistance to Korea and the USSR  
provided both Chinese <sup>supplies</sup> and Korean  
forces to fight with. Thus, it must  
be recognised that once the U.S. entered the  
war it technically became "internationalised",  
and this <sup>made</sup> ~~placed~~ Korea ~~an~~ conflict apart  
of the great cold war climate in which



NSC-68 <sup>divided</sup> ~~potentially~~ the world as Communist and Capitalist. Thus, suggestions in Frank's interpretation alludes to "military readiness in August 1950" and he further supports the idea that in this context attack from the West on Communism was <sup>a threat</sup> ~~potentially~~ to the strength of the ~~low~~ rise of Communism both in Asia and in Europe. Thus, the crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel into North Korea did not "trigger" Chinese entry but consolidated the need to protect <sup>North</sup> Korea as a member of the greater "Communist Monolithic Bloc". On behalf of the USSR, and for Chinese ideological protection

<sup>Moreover</sup> ~~Additionally~~, it can be recognised that the security threats posed by the USA also predated the crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and this expansion of war consolidated fears and the necessity to enter rather than created them.

Although Brogan's interpretation suggests that the U.S invasion of North Korea was "intolerable" other actions by the U.S particularly by MacArthur demonstrated the necessity to enter the war. This refers back to the "deep roots" which Frank alludes to. After the North Korean crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel Truman responded by sending the 7<sup>th</sup> fleet



to the Taiwan <sup>strait</sup> states and Mac both publicly  
praised Jiang Jieshi. This ~~demonstrated~~ <sup>was</sup> suggested  
to China a reintegration into the Chinese  
civil war and allies such as Britain also  
criticised this policy as provocative. This serves  
to further give credit to Frank's interpretation  
who alludes to China's military preparedness  
which predated the Crossing of the 3<sup>rd</sup>  
parallel. This, although as Brogan's interpretation  
suggests that the U.S advance into Korea<sup>North</sup>  
demonstrated potential issues for China,  
these were already fears that China was  
aware of and thus the U.S advance did not  
"trigger" Chinese entry but consolidated its  
necessity.

Furthermore, it must be recognised that China's  
entry into the war was also potentially an  
example of opportunism for the newly formed  
Communist state. Brogan's interpretation highlights  
the role China thought it could play "  
the moment to avert a Third World War".  
This demonstrates the way China was also  
seeking to gain prestige by challenging the  
west. This is a prospect which the crossing  
by UN/US/ROK forces opened up but not  
something which <sup>would</sup> ~~was~~ have been overlooked.



By this time as well China and USSR were already facing tensions due to the ideological conflicts surrounding the interpretation of Marx and thus USSR were worried North Korea would turn to <sup>Mao</sup> China instead of Stalin for communist influence. Moreover, China after experiencing years of war and turmoil perhaps saw the Korean War as a method to unify the country and some historians go as far to say it allowed Mao to consolidate his oppressive regime. Thus, this further supports Frank's interpretation that China did not overlook the U.S. threat in the Korean War and were only triggered after an advance but in fact suggests that the crossing and operation on the Chinese border gave Mao a justification and reasoning to present China on the "world stage" and gain prestige as both a protector of communism and a force able to halt the U.S. Subsequently, this is what did happen, the world was impressed by China's ability to halt the U.S. in their attempts at roll back. Thus, Hagers interpretation is limited in the sense it does not acknowledge the political climate or ulterior motives of the world powers of the time. Thus, once again the U.S. invasion of North Korea did not





"tragedy" China's involvement but justified the entry as a part of a greater political opportunity to gain prestige and consolidate power.

In conclusion, although Brogan is justified in the respect it acknowledges the evidence which highlights China's supposed unwillingness to enter the war unless North Korea was threatened. However, faults to recognize the great cold war climate which made Chinese entry inevitable and moreover the opportunity in Korea war provided. In this respect Frank is more convincing in the way he acknowledges Chinese awareness of U.S. actions and the security threats predated the North Korea invasion. Moreover, Brogan although not explicitly does suggest it was an accumulation of actions not only one which consolidated China's need to enter the war. Overall, Chinese entry into the war was not triggered by the invasion of North Korea, but consolidated in the sense it affirmed security threats, the need to protect Communism and of course demonstrated and opportunity to reestablish itself onto the world stage.





Thus, the crossing of 38<sup>th</sup> parallel into China  
did not "trigger" Chinese entrance but  
consolidated the necessity both domestically and  
politically to do so.

